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This paper applies a pseudo panel methodology to investigate the evolution of financial investments 
in training at the firm level over time. This approach enables a more meaningful exploration of inter-
temporal changes in situations where longitudinal data does not exist. 
Purpose 
The evolution of firm level practices over time has always been a keen area of interest for 
management scholars in general and more specifically scholars of HRM. However, in comparison to 
other social scientists, particularly economists, the relative dearth of firm level panel data sets has 
restricted the methodological options for exploring inter-temporal changes. This paper utilises the 
repeating Cranet international data set, 10 countries over 18 years, and creates pseudo panels as a 
viable alternative to exploring firm level changes over time.  
Findings 
The analysis is framed within a varieties of capitalism lens and by adopting a more meaningful 
approach to examining changes over time it leads us to question some of the ‘truisms’ linked to 
firms expected behaviours within different national institutional frameworks. In this case, doubt is 
cast over the expectation that firms in coordinated market economies are likely to display a stronger 
financial commitment towards training their workforce. In addition, it also indicates that the 
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relationship between training spend and the business cycle may not be as strong as previously 
thought. 
Research Limitations/Implications 
As with any large-scale quantitative analysis, it would always benefits from a larger number of 
observations and/or a longer time period, in this instance access to annual data rather than 4 or 5 
year intervals would have been helpful. In addition being able to use survey weights within the 
analysis would have been useful, but they are not available for this data set. However, it does at 
least offer a viable methodological approach for scholars in scenarios where longitudinal data is 
highly unlikely to be available over lengthy time periods. 
Practical Implications 
By adopting a different, and more appropriate, approach to analysing existing cross-sectional data 
over time this empirical research helps to achieve a deeper understanding of the complex issues that 
influence decision making at the firm level. Over time, this will enable policy makers to become 
better informed of the factors determining change over time. 
Social Implications 
At the firm level, in line with the practical implications above, this will enable decision makers to 
achieve a deeper understanding of the evolution of the external context in which they operate and 
the likely influence of that evolution within their own organisation. It will subsequently be able to 





PANEL DATA OR PSEUDO PANELS FOR LONGITUDINAL RESEARCH?  
CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISONS USING THE EXAMPLE OF FIRMS’ TRAINING SPEND. 
Introduction 
One of the most important developments within quantitative empirical analysis of management 
policies and practices over the last three or four decades has been the increased use, and wider 
applications, of longitudinal data, enabling the more effective analysis of the dynamics of change 
within any population. This progress has to be tempered though by the usual criticisms that, 
although it includes repeated observations of the same respondents and allows change within the 
same sample to be explored, attrition rates make it very difficult to sustain a meaningful panel over 
any extended period. In addition, any analysis simply highlights behaviour and changes to that 
behaviour amongst the panel respondents, who may not necessarily continue to be representative 
of the overall population. In addition, the problem of persistent measurement error has been 
highlighted (Ashenfelter 1983). A counterview, which we present here, is that repeated cross-
sections, regularly updated to ensure representative samples, may well paint a more realistic picture 
of changes over time. 
Longitudinal panel data undoubtedly facilitates the exploration of different features. For example, in 
macroeconomics the relationship between growth of the economy and domestic consumption is a 
key determinant of the effectiveness of any expansionary/ contractionary policy intervention and 
the propensity to consume from any additional income is the key factor in this relationship. In the 
USA, once the Panel Study of Income Dynamics data set became available for empirical analysis, it 
was clear that previous estimates of the propensity to consume using repeated cross-sections were 
significantly different from those emanating from panel data. Kuznets (1962) highlighted that in 
estimating elasticities of the coefficients many groups of goods and commodities were significantly 
higher as measured by cross-sections than they were as measured by time series data, suggesting 
that the responsiveness of demand to changes in income were not as high as previously thought. As 
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a consequence, a re-evaluation of the likely impact and effectiveness of various macroeconomic 
policies, plus an updating of the forecasting models, was required.  
Although longitudinal data does support the exploration of different phenomena and the application 
of different methods, such data remain relatively uncommon, so the question of what to do in the 
absence of panel evidence still remains. However, since the seminal paper by Deaton (1985), the 
creation of a pseudo panel based on identifiable groups with fixed membership has offered a 
potential solution to this problem. The basis of the approach is that within the group individual 
observations can be replaced by group means as the basis for empirical analysis. A pseudo panel 
approach does lend itself to the analysis of firms’ behaviour over time since the prevalence of 
longitudinal data sets is considerably rarer than with household surveys. The much higher attrition 
rates caused by company failures as well as mergers and acquisitions mean that the structure of any 
business panel is unable to survive for too long. For example, more recent waves of the Workplace 
Employment Relations Survey (WERS) data set include a subset of the data which are repeated 
collections from the same workplaces, i.e. a panel, however these are available for two consecutive 
waves only, presumably due to attrition, and as a result the analysis of inter-temporal changes over 
an extended period is impossible.  
We take as an example of pseudo-panel data the repeating, internationally comparative, Cranet 
survey into human resource management (HRM). The Cranet data set fits our case as it is a repeated 
cross-sectional survey of organisations, representative at the national level by industry (based on the 
most relevant criterion for HRM, of employment) and by size (above 50 employees). The survey is 
repeated every 4-5 years. There are currently 6 waves of data collected between 1991 and 2013 
available for analysis, hence they offer the potential for exploration of organisational behaviour and 
changes to that behaviour over a significantly longer time period than is available in most such 
surveys. The data set is also able to highlight the potential impact of unobserved group effects 
within that analysis. This paper seeks to make use of these data and takes as a specific a large scale 
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inter-temporal and cross-country analysis of the financial commitment to training at the firm level 
using a pseudo panel approach. Training spend is chosen as the focus for the analysis since it is a key 
indicator of the extent to which the development of the human resource is pursued at the 
organisational level. In addition, there are likely to be distinct and predictable differences in the 
extent of the commitment to training across countries, as well as over time, and the following 
section will outline the theoretical underpinning for this. 
Background 
Over the last two decades, within the broad fields of international management and international 
HRM, it has become increasingly common to utilise the varieties of capitalism (VOC) literature as a 
means of rationalising and understanding cross-country differences in various types of behaviour at 
the firm level as well as within firms. Since the work of Whitley (1999), Hall and Soskice (2001) and 
Amable (2003) which developed and then refined the concepts of liberal market economies (LMEs) 
and coordinated market economies (CMEs) there have been numerous empirical studies exploring 
and highlighting the typical behaviours of firms within these differing national institutional 
frameworks (see Dilli et al 2018, Feldman 2019 and Hall 2018 as examples of some of the more 
recent applications). The basis of the distinction between the two types of economy is 
fundamentally the way that resources are allocated, with LMEs tending to be more reliant on market 
transactions and competition and CMEs, as the name suggests, have a greater tendency towards 
coordination between organisations and major stakeholders. The most important resultant 
distinction for the purpose of this study is that within the VOC economy types there is a tendency 
towards a very different relationship between the firm and the external market as well as a very 
different level of interdependence between the employer and its employees. In terms of the latter, 
LMEs are likely to be competitive for labour between themselves whereas in CMEs employees have 
stronger rights in their job and are more likely to stay with the employer for longer periods of time.   
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The upshot is that the various authorities expect that LMEs firms will be more willing to perceive and 
utilise the external labour market as a source of skills, i.e. for LMEs where particular skills are not 
available in sufficient quantities within a firm that firm is more likely to recruit externally to address 
that shortfall. By contrast, in CMEs firms are more likely to perceive their existing workforce as a 
source of skills and when faced with the same challenge of lack of skills a firm within a CME would be 
more likely to train and develop existing employees to address the problem. In archetypal CME 
firms, the external labour market is only typically used for recruitment into entry-level positions, to 
replace people who leave and in periods of business expansion. Therefore, for the purposes of the 
empirical analysis, this leads us to our main hypothesis; 
H1: Firms operating within CMEs are likely to invest proportionally more in training for 
their existing workforce than those in LMEs.   
Data  
The data used for our analyses come then from the repeating Cranet survey. Data is collected from 
the senior HRM person in each establishment, across both the public and private sectors, via a 
questionnaire that is completed by a representative sample of employers, stratified by employment 
numbers at the national level. For the purpose of this empirical analysis, data are used from the 
most recent waves and from 10 countries that were included in each such wave. The reasoning 
behind these two choices was firstly that the 10 countries were the ones which easily fitted into the 
various definitions of LMEs and CMEs with the countries being: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden Switzerland as the CME countries and the UK as the one 
representative of an LME. In the larger countries the data collected were a representative sample of 
the overall populations by employment, in the smaller countries these were full population surveys. 
The 5 waves give a sufficient time period (twenty years, corresponding to 1995, 1999, 2005, 2010, 
2013) to enable us to identify any inter-temporal factors through the pseudo panel approach that 




When the analyses were performed using the pooled Cranet data, we relied on OLS estimation. The 
model can be written as follows: 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖 = 𝛽1𝐶𝑀𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖   
where the dependent variable is the annual training spend as a proportion of the total wage bill for 
the 𝑖𝑡ℎ firm, CME is the key explanatory variable of interest which takes the value of 1 for 
coordinated market economies (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden Switzerland) and 0 for liberal market economies (UK). 𝑋𝑖 includes a set of controls 
including union density, the extent of strategic HRM (coded in four categories as follows: 1) not 
consulted, 2) implementation, 3) consultative, 4) from the outset), size of the firm, industry 
(categorised as services and manufacturing), presence of a joint consultative committee (JCC), 
annual staff turnover and time (year dummies for 1995, 1999, 2005, 2010, 2015) and, 𝜀𝑖  is the error 
term. The reference category being a UK manufacturing company without a JCC in 1995 that does 
not consult HRM on strategic decisions.  
In terms of the explanatory variables the CME dummy is included to facilitate the testing of the 
formal hypothesis and, hence, the remainder are included as controls. Size is included since there is 
a likelihood that larger and more complex organisations may well invest more in training since they 
have greater scope and capacity to develop people internally. Time dummies are added simply to 
pick up the likely influence of the business cycle and other trends upon economic activity. Strategic 
HRM, the proportion of employees who are trade union members and JCC variables are included 
since they all reflect the presence of an additional voice in the decision-making process that is likely 
to be supportive of investment in training. Finally, annual staff turnover is included, simply to control 
for the likelihood of higher initial induction costs that would be incurred with higher turnover rates. 
The descriptive statistics for all of these variables from the individual firm level data are recorded 
below in Table 1. 
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Following the OLS estimation with time dummies using the pooled data, the same model was 
replicated benefiting from the pseudo-panel approach. As explained earlier, pseudo-panels move 
the unit of analysis from individual units – in our case firms – to subgroups or cohorts of a 
population. One of the most important, and challenging, elements in constructing the pseudo-panels 
is to ensure that the sub-groups are defined by a set of characteristics that do not change or could 
be assumed to remain relatively stable over the time under consideration (Russell and Fraas, 2005; 
Verbeek, 2008; Meng et al., 2014). This ensures that while the firms within the subgroups might 
change over the years, the characteristics of the groups they belong to can be considered as stable. 
Given the difficulties associated with deciding the optimal sub-groups forming the pseudo panels, it 
is common to test different combinations (see, for example, Meng et al., 2014) – a practice which is 
also employed in this paper.   
The decision on sub-groups involves a trade-off: while a greater number of sub-groups brings about 
increased heterogeneity of pseudo-panels, this also reduces the number of firms within each sub-
group which may result in less precise estimates of sub-group means (Moffit, 1993; Verbeek and 
Vella, 2005). This becomes particularly challenging as firm-level data already suffer from smaller 
sample sizes when compared to national-level individual data sets. Nevertheless, in order to 
maximise precision and minimise measurement errors, it is necessary to have sufficiently large 
number of observations in sub-groups (cells).1 Using simulation techniques and based on individual-
level data, Verbeek and Nijman (1993) showed that cells must include about 100 individuals, though 
smaller cell sizes can be acceptable if the individuals within the cells are sufficiently homogenous. In 
 
1 When corresponding cells do not include the same individuals in two different periods, measurement errors 
could occur in pseudo panels. As noted in Gardes et al. (2005), if the first observation for cell 1 during the first 
period is an individual X, it will be paired with a similar individual Y observed during the second period. 
Therefore, measurement error arises between this observation of Y and the true values for X if X had been 
observed during the second period (Gardes et al., 2005: 243). However, this sort of measurement error is 
insignificant when cell sizes are large (Moffit, 1993; Verbeek and Nijman, 1993; Gardes et al., 2005) and, our 
cell size restrictions of minimum 30 firms should eliminate such concerns. Moreover, our unit of analysis are 
firms which may also reduce the extent of any measurement error caused by not having the same firms across 
the periods – it is likely that the group of firms with same characteristics will be less prone to measurement 
error in comparison to the group of individuals.  
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contrast, when sample size across the subgroups (cells) are too large, then there is a risk of loss of 
efficiency of the estimators.  
The solution proposed for such challenges associated with creating pseudo-panels is to generate 
optimal groups where the loss of efficiency is reduced and the measurement error is negligible 
(Baltagi 1995; Gardes et al., 2005). This requires a thorough consideration when defining potential 
cohort/subgroups and ensuring that heterogeneity within them is minimized whilst heterogeneity 
between them is maximized (Cramer, 1964; Verbeek and Nijman, 1993). Once these empirical 
principles are followed and implemented to the data of interest carefully, consistent and efficient 
estimators can be obtained using pseudo-panels (Gardes et al., 2005).In light of the existing work, 
we tested the validity of several combinations to ensure that firms within the Cranet data are 
grouped into homogeneous and sufficiently large groups to achieve the most precise estimates.  
Some examples of our initial attempts include creating pseudo panels with detailed industry 
categories2 and the use of individual countries rather than the CME and LME sub-categories in 
addition to the standard candidates for grouping the firms (such as sector, union membership and so 
on). However, these combinations resulted in very small cell sizes and it was not possible to achieve 
precise estimates.3  
After testing the validity of several combinations, the subgroups of our pseudo panel were created 
based on two types of market economies (CMEs and LMEs), five time periods (years 1995, 1999, 
2005, 2010, 2015), four strategic HRM characteristics, two industries (services and manufacturing), 
 
2 Rather than aggregating the industries into services and manufacturing, we benefited from the more detailed 
industry categories available in the Cranet data including sub-divisions within the manufacture and service 
sectors (e.g., non-energy chemicals, metal manufacture, other manufacture, banking and finance, personal 
services, other services). 
3 To give an example, when individual countries, union membership, industry, strategic HRM, public/private 
sector and the presence of JCC were used in forming the sub-groups, 70.24% of the subgroups turned out to 
have sample size of 30 firms or less. On the contrary, when CME, industry, public/private sector and the 
presence of JCC were used in creating the subgroups, sample sizes within the groups were no longer an issue 
(more than 95% of the subgroups had more than 30 firms). Nevertheless, this resulted in a limited number of 
subgroups (39 subgroups with more than 30 firms) and less variation between them. Results from these 
attempts can be provided by the authors upon request. 
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two sectors (public and private) and presence of JCC. Although this would normally produce 320 sub-
groups, given that some combinations lacked observations, we ended up with 236 sub-groups. 
Another caveat relates to the sample size for each sub-group. Whilst our intention was to exclude 
sub-groups with less than 100 observations as suggested by Verbeek and Nijman (1993) as optimal 
minimum; this would mean excluding a disproportionately large portion of the data.  Nevertheless, 
as argued by the authors, smaller cell sizes could well be justified in cases where sub-groups are 
relatively more homogenous. In parallel, there are examples of pseudo-panels including smaller sub-
group sizes (for instance, Propper, Rees and Green, 2001; Meng et al. 2014) or without any 
restrictions in sub-group sizes in case of repeated cross-sectional firm-level data (Brookes at al, 
2017). Here, following the examples in the literature, we excluded those with less than 30 
observations which is justifiable and pragmatic given the firm-level data.4 This reduced the total 
number of subgroups to 61. This exclusion was necessary for a precise estimation which meets the 
required asymptotic properties for the pseudo-panel approach (see Verbeek, 2008 for a detailed 
discussion). Exclusion of subgroups with less than 30 observations resulted in losing a quarter of the 
total number of subgroups. We considered this an optimal minimum as excluding further sub-groups 
could have meant decreasing the heterogeneity of our pseudo-panel. Nevertheless, the results from 
the unrestricted panel (with no restrictions on cell size) will also be presented for completeness and 
comparison purposes  
Once the pseudo-panels are created, the next step includes applying the standard panel data 
methods. We considered using the two most common methods adopted in analysing the panel data: 
fixed effects and random effects. Whilst random effects assume that unobserved individual effects 
(𝛼𝑖) are not correlated with the independent variables, fixed effects allow for an arbitrary correlation 
between the two (Woolbridge, 2009). However, with fixed effect models, we cannot estimate the 





CMEs and LMEs) are, by definition, time invariant. In fact, several other important control variables 
in our empirical specification are time-invariant. Acknowledging that explanatory variables being 
time invariant do not offer a full justification for choosing random effects over fixed effects, we 
performed a Hausman test to differentiate between the two models. Hausman test pointed the use 
of random effects as preferred model. 5 
The random effects model could be expressed as follows:  
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐶𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where, different from the previous OLS model with pooled data, the time dimension is introduced, 
and our dependent variable is now the training spent by the 𝑖𝑡ℎ firm at time 𝑡. 𝛼 is the unobserved 
time invariant individual effect.  
Finally, in order to test for random effects, we applied Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM) test 
which helps to distinguish between the use of random effects or a simple OLS regression. The test 
indicated the use of random effects as an appropriate method.  
Findings 
The results from the pooled data and pseudo panels are presented in Table 2.  
The first column of Table 2 shows the results based on the OLS estimation with pooled data.  CMEs 
were found to spend more on training when compared to LMEs. A greater commitment to strategic 
HRM was linked to an increased amount spent on training. Firms in service industries were likely to 
spend more on training but the opposite was true for those in the public sector. The presence of a 
JCC showed a negative association. Although this may be counterintuitive, since it would be 
anticipated that staff side voices on JCCs are likely to be supportive of additional training 
 
5 Fixed Effects Model is still estimated for comparison purposes. The effects of time variant explanatory 
variables were similar to the ones observed using Random Effects Model (i.e., positive and statistically 
significant coefficient for union density and labour turnover). The results from the fixed effect model and the 
Hausman test are available upon request. 
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opportunities, it may well also be the case that such voices and businesses are also more skilled in 
securing training funded by external sources and the direct training cost to the firm is thus reduced. 
Also, although the coefficient was small, union density had a negative effect on the training spend. 
This too may appear to be counterintuitive since a trade union is always likely to be another voice 
promoting additional training, but it also needs to be remembered that unions are often successful 
in being able to increase wage levels for their members hence, if the latter is proportionally greater 
than the former, training spend as a percentage of the total wage bill is likely to fall and not rise.  
When the analyses were replicated using a pseudo panel approach, results from our preferred 
pseudo panel data (column 2, Table 2) indicated that training spending of firms operating in CMEs 
were no longer statistically different than those in LMEs. While the effect of many other explanatory 
variables such as industry, sector, presence of JCC remained similar across the models, pseudo panel 
estimations showed a positive role of union density in training spent, contrary to the results based 
on the pooled data. Additionally, the coefficient on firm size became statistically significant and 
presented a negative effect on the training spent. Finally, annual staff turnover was shown to be 
positively linked to training spending; an effect which was not evident in the OLS model. 
In relation to the formal hypothesis, clearly the pooled data estimates strongly support the view that 
CME based firms typically invest proportionally more in staff training, whilst once we adopt the 
pseudo panel approach the estimated results no longer support this. The explanation for this may 
well be that once group effects are introduced into the analysis the unobserved elements of that are 
more important than differences across economy types, but what those group effects may be are 
unobservable within these data. 
The other variable of interest is union density and the transition of the estimated coefficient from 
negative and significant in the pooled cross-section to positive and significant in the restricted 
pseudo panel model. In the first instance it has already been highlighted that if unions raise wages 
by proportionally more than training spend then a negative coefficient would result. However, once 
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we have introduced group effects and the coefficient becomes positive, this may well suggest that 
unions have a much greater influence on training spend at the industry level rather than at the firm 
level.   
At first glance it could well be concluded that the changes that result from moving from the pooled 
cross-section to the pseudo panel may simply reflect the smaller sample size, and resultant fall in 
explanatory power, inherent within pseudo panel estimates. This may well be the case with the 
unrestricted model (no restriction on cell size), reported in column 3 of Table 2, since virtually all the 
explanatory variables lose significance in comparison to the initial estimates. However, with the 
restricted sample reported in column 2, where the sample size is even smaller but the subgroups are 
more robust, most of the explanatory variables retain their level of significance. We would therefore 
argue that this supports the view of the pseudo panel as a viable and potentially more revealing 
approach to inter-temporal analysis. 
Finally, it would be worthwhile to comment upon the time dummies presented in each model. As 
seen in Table 2, the coefficients for the time dummies are all positive and statistically significant; 
they increase gradually up until 2008 and drop slightly in 2013. This strong time trend is not 
immediately obvious in pseudo-panel estimations; we see the coefficients are statistically significant 
only for 2003 and 2013. Nevertheless, the coefficients are similar in magnitude and the higher 
standard deviations observed in pseudo panel might be due to the smaller sample size.  
These results suggest that estimations based on pooled cross-sectional data might actually represent 
an accurate reflection of what has been happening in the economy over and above the impact of 
explanatory variables included in our models. However, it is also possible that what we are seeing in 
the pseudo panel is a combination of decisions made at the firm level as well as changes at the 
industry level. This would be individual firms choosing to invest more (or less) in training or 
industries expanding (or contracting) in line with the business cycle and them having a greater (or 
lesser) training need. Closer inspection of the data reveals the latter to be stronger. Across the 
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whole sample the industry categories metal and other manufacturing fall from 32% to only 21% of 
the total firms in the data set between 1995 and 2013. Whilst in the categories banking and finance, 
health, and other services, industries that display higher proportionate spending on training 
throughout, the presence has increased from 21% in 1995 to 39% by 2013. As a result this suggests 
that the upward trend in training spend is less to do with individual enterprises opting to invest to a 
greater extent in training and more to do with the evolution of the economy. With this evolution 
involving a contraction in manufacturing and growth in services, with some of the service sector 
industries having a consistently greater training requirement. An overall implication of this is that 
the need for additional training is likely to increase still further if this process continues and, whether 
this training emanates from the state, sector or individual firms, there will need to be an increased 
commitment to training from somewhere within the economy. 
Conclusion 
Overall, there are three key things to take away from this paper and the related analysis. First, in 
situations where there are repeated cross-sections at the firm level, pseudo panels do offer a viable 
approach to estimating relationships over extended periods, at the very least as a means of checking 
and confirming findings from pooled cross-sections. Therefore, we would recommend that future 
researchers pursue this course of action wherever possible. Second, it does possibly start to question 
some of the ‘truisms’ associated with the varieties of capitalism literature. For example, it would 
largely be taken as a given that comparable firms in CMEs are on average likely to show a greater 
commitment to training than their counterparts in LMEs. However the pseudo panel estimates do at 
least suggest that this might not necessarily be the case, hence some of these relationships that 
have been supported to date via pooled cross-sectional analysis may need to be revisited in order to 
further explore some of the previously unexplained dynamics underpinning the relationships as well 
as potentially revealing what some of the unobserved group effects might be. Finally, it does help 
deliver a clearer understanding of changes over time, with the pseudo panel estimates highlighting 
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the relative importance of sectoral expansion/contraction to the commitment to spending on 
training across the economy. With this implying that training spend within individual firms may not 
be as sensitive to changes in the business cycle as might be expected and, in addition, this is 
common across both CMEs and LMEs. Both of these final points support the view that future 
research in these areas needs to focus more clearly upon the impact of separate changes at the 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
 Variable Mean 




HRM Strategy  
  Not consulted 0.08 
  Implementation 0.05 
  Consultative 0.34 
  From the outset 0.52 
Manufacture  0.43 
Service 0.57 




Union Density 48.6 
 (17.18) 
Number of Obs 6419 




Table 2 Pooled cross-section and pseudo-panel estimations 
 Pooled data Cell>30 No restriction 
    
CME 0.297*** -0.365 0.231 
 (0.109) (0.399) (0.289) 
JCC -0.377*** -0.672** -0.562** 
 (0.110) (0.275) (0.261) 
Size (log) -0.044 -0.576* 0.134 
 (0.036) (0.322) (0.201) 
Union Density -0.003** 0.035** 0.013 
 (0.001) (0.015) (0.008) 
HRM Strategy    
Implementation 0.270 -0.073 0.298 
 (0.201) (0.377) (0.325) 
Consultative 0.346** 0.587** 0.164 
 (0.163) (0.274) (0.316) 
From the outset 0.677*** 0.665** 0.676** 
 (0.149) (0.283) (0.313) 
Public -0.345*** -1.274*** -0.368 
 (0.116) (0.403) (0.291) 
Service sector 0.360*** 0.778*** 0.021 
 (0.100) (0.292) (0.243) 
Turnover -0.003 0.099** 0.051 
 (0.007) (0.048) (0.034) 
Year Dummies    
1999 0.319*** -0.090 0.152 
 (0.123) (0.315) (0.354) 
2003 0.604*** 0.640* 0.299 
 (0.127) (0.336) (0.395) 
2008 0.749*** 0.698 1.822*** 
 (0.164) (0.430) (0.420) 
2013 0.661*** 0.685* 0.722* 
 (0.154) (0.398) (0.424) 
Constant 2.751*** 4.422** 0.919 
 (0.296) (2.151) (1.393) 
    
Observations 6,419 61 236 
Number of groups  23 57 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Base category for the Strategic HRM is the 
“not consulted” category.  
 
 
 
 
